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7.1  Prologue 
In 1953, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce proposed a major expansion in the 
coverage of the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Program-the  program that 
we now think of as Social Security. There was much room for expansion be- 
cause only 55% of the workforce was covered when the Social Security Act 
was passed  in  1935. Legislation enacted in  1950 had already expanded the 
coverage of the program.  It brought many additional workers into the Social 
Security system and substantially reduced the number of quarters of covered 
employment that were necessary to qualify for retirement benefits. However, 
these changes came too late for many people. Many workers had retired before 
1950. Others died without working  long enough to qualify, leaving  widows 
who were not eligible for survivors insurance. Under the Social Security Act, 
these unfortunate people were eligible only for Old Age Assistance, the less- 
generous, means-tested welfare program administered by the states. 
Under the chamber’s proposal, everyone over the age of  sixty-five would 
immediately become eligible for retirement benefits. The Old Age Assistance 
program would be terminated.  Retirement  benefits would  continue to be  fi- 
nanced on a pay-as-you-go basis, using a payroll tax. All remaining workers 
who had not yet been brought into the Social Security system would be sub- 
jected to the payroll tax, but the tax rate would still have to be increased to pay 
for the expanded system of benefits. 
From the perspective of the 1990s, it seems odd that a proposal for expanded 
social spending should come from a major business lobby. The political re- 
sponse this proposal provoked is equally surprising. Conservative Republicans 
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in Congress took the initiative in promoting the chamber’s plan. Daniel Reed, 
the conservative chairman of the Republican-controlled Ways and Means Com- 
mittee, called for fundamental reexamination of the system. Carl Curtis, a Re- 
publican from Nebraska who had been critical of the evolving Social Security 
system, chaired the subcommittee hearings on the chamber’s proposal and took 
the lead in promoting it in Congress. After lengthy consideration, the liberal 
Republicans  in control of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
in the new Eisenhower administration decided not to support it. Nelson Rocke- 
feller, the undersecretary  responsible  for legislative proposals, was generally 
supportive of the existing Social Security system and did not want to propose 
any major changes to its structure. Senior citizens, even those who would be- 
come eligible for retirement benefits under the chamber’s plan, did not offer 
any organized support for the plan. 
Program executives in the Social Security Administration reacted with alarm 
and outrage to the hearings conducted by  Curtis. As government employees, 
and especially as holdovers from the previous Democratic administration, they 
were constrained from openly attacking the merits of the proposal and the in- 
tegrity of the members of Congress who supported it. However, they did feed 
analyses and denunciations to sympathetic policy analysts on the staff of the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL), who passed them on to the Washington 
press corps. Because the Eisenhower administration did not support the cham- 
ber’s plan and because opponents were able to characterize it as a dangerous 
assault by enemies of the Social Security system, it never received serious con- 
sideration in Congress. 
Five years later, in 1958, internal estimates prepared by the Research Depart- 
ment of the Social Security Administration  showed  that 35% of the people 
over age sixty-five still were not eligible for Social Security retirement benefits 
(Cates 1983,72). Large numbers of them had no private source of income and 
refused to accept public assistance-to  “go on the dole.” They lived out their 
lives in circumstances of extreme poverty. Ultimately, the Social Security sys- 
tem did succeed in reducing poverty among the elderly, but demographics were 
an important  part of the story. The poverty rate fell as the uncovered  elderly 
died.  I 
7.2  Introduction and Summary of the Argument 
The arguments in this paper address three types of questions. The most spe- 
cific question, and the one that is easiest to answer, is why the different actors 
in the Social Security debate of the 1950s chose such surprising political strate- 
gies. The answer to this  narrow  question  raises  a  second  question  that  is 
broader and more troubling for economists, one that goes to the heart of any 
I. See Derthick ( 1979, chap. 6) for details of the chamber’s proposal and the debate it spawned. 
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analysis of political economy: What determines  why  and how people vote? 
This second question is important in its own right, but it is raised here with a 
view toward  an even deeper and more controversial third question: How can 
economists and like-minded  social scientists begin to address the effects that 
values have on policy choices and that policies have on values? 
The logic behind the liberal and conservative strategies during the 1950s is 
clear from the historical record. Both sides in the fight over the Social Security 
system adopted positions that seemed to run counter to their natural interests, 
because they were actually fighting over something far more important than 
expanding  benefits for the uncovered  elderly. They  made  important  tactical 
concessions to win the war over the public’s sense of entitlement. This explana- 
tion covers the behavior of the proponents and critics of the chamber’s plan, 
but  it leaves open the question  of  why  the elderly, especially the uncovered 
elderly, were absent from the debate. Observing that they were not organized 
then is not an explanation.  It is a description of the fact that needs to be ex- 
plained. We will return to this issue in the conclusion. 
Conservative critics of  the  Social Security system were willing to accept 
higher current payments in hopes of limiting future growth in payments. Spe- 
cifically, they were willing to accept an expansion of the Social Security pro- 
gram in exchange for structural changes that would keep voters from treating 
Social Security retirement  benefits  as  an  entitlement.  The chamber’s  plan 
would dispense with the carefully crafted imagery of individual contributions 
and personal retirement accounts that the architects of the Social Security sys- 
tem had been developing for fifteen years. It  would remove all pretense that 
there was any link between taxes paid and benefits received. It would lay bare 
the economic essence of the program, showing that it was a system of transfers 
from the young to the old. No voter believes that paying income taxes entitles 
the payer to cash welfare benefits. If it had been adopted, the chamber’s plan 
would have given payroll  taxes and government payments to the elderly the 
same political status as income taxes and welfare payments. 
On the other side, the proponents of the Social Security system sacrificed 
the well-being of the uncovered elderly to create a system of government trans- 
fers that recipients would regard as an entitlement. Program administrators in 
the Social Security Administration  reacted with anger and indignation to the 
hearing chaired by Curtis because his goal was to demolish the imagery that 
was at the heart of the program. He wanted to show that the previous adminis- 
tration had intentionally misled the public about the nature of the program. The 
sacrifice of the uncovered elderly was just one of several tactical concessions 
advocates of the system made as part  of a long-run  strategy for convincing 
people that they  were entitled  to payments from the government. A similar 
concession came in the decision to finance Social Security payments with a 
regressive payroll tax. President Roosevelt personally  vetoed early proposals 
that retirement benefits be financed partially from general tax revenues. In a 
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behind his strategy. When a visitor to the White House complained about the 
regressivity of the payroll tax, he explained: “I guess you are right about the 
economics, but those taxes were never a problem of economics. They are poli- 
tics all the way through. We put those payroll contributions there so as to give 
the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions. . . . 
With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security 
program” (quoted in Derthick 1979, 230). 
The evidence presented in section 7.6 documents the claim that the funda- 
mental issue in the fight over Social Security in the 1950s-in  fact, the funda- 
mental issue in the construction of the entire Social Security program-was 
the notion of entitlement. Both sides recognized the importance of the implicit 
promises that were bundled with the taxes and transfers, although conservative 
critics of the program were arguably slower to catch on to the importance of 
this  issue. In  light of  subsequent  political  developments,  Roosevelt and his 
allies in the Social Security  Administration decisively won the war and imbued 
the Social Security program with a strong sense of entitlement. At a time when 
even the most radical budget cutters in Congress are afraid to even mention 
Social Security, it is hard to dispute the accuracy of Roosevelt’s implicit model 
of how the political process works. 
This explanation leads inexorably to the second question about the motiva- 
tions that determine whether and how people vote. If the notion of entitlement 
is such an important political force, something important is missing from for- 
mal economic models of voting. Most conventional models of political econ- 
omy  summarize individual behavior  with the assumption  that people prefer 
more  wealth to  less. They also assume that a person  will  vote for a policy 
that would increase the voter’s wealth.? The first assumption generally passes 
without  comment. The second assumption  is  highly  problematic,  as many 
economists and  political  scientists  have  noted.  But  setting  aside the  well- 
known difficulty of explaining why anyone bothers to vote when the chances 
that one vote will matter are so small, economists are still faced with the awk- 
ward fact that their style of analysis permits no distinction between  govern- 
ment payments that take the form of welfare checks and payments that take the 
form of Social Security benefits; that is, the standard model cannot distinguish 
between transfers and entitlements. 
The models suggest that, everything else equal, voters will prefer larger pay- 
ments from the government to smaller payments. From the individual’s point 
of view, it makes no difference whether these payments are labeled “earned 
benefits” or “welfare payments.” It makes no difference whether the voter has 
paid payroll taxes or not, or whether government officials made any promises 
about benefit payments when they collected those payroll  taxes. As a result, 
2. For a presentation of  models of  this type as applied to the analysis of  voting on Social Secu- 
rity, see the model in Boadway and Wildasin (1989) and the models from other papers that are 
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conventional models cannot accommodate the concept of entitlement,  the issue 
that was the paramount concern of both the proponents and critics of the evolv- 
ing Social Security system. 
In a model of repeated interaction  between two people, concepts such as 
reputation and punishment strategies can be invoked to give meaning to every- 
day concepts such as a promise or an entitlement. But in situations in which 
millions of voters interact with a small number of elected officials, it makes 
no sense to assert that any individual voter sets out to establish a reputation for 
toughness or to punish bad behavior by the government. 
In an effort to go beyond the limitations of existing models of political econ- 
omy, section 7.3 starts by briefly summarizing some of the early discussion in 
political science about formal models of voting. It recapitulates the conclusion 
that emerges from this literature-that  economists and political scientists must 
modify the assumption that maximizing wealth is a good summary description 
of the motivation of  an individual  voter. Stated more explicitly,  we have to 
go beyond the assumption that conventional consumption goods are the only 
arguments in a person’s utility function and allow the act of voting to be a 
consumption activity that provides utility. As many political scientists have em- 
phasized  (see, for example, Aldrich  1993 and Jackman  1993), this does not 
signal a retreat from rational-choice  models. It is merely a refinement of the 
objective function that a rational voter seeks to maximize. 
Section 7.4 shows how an extended model of individual preferences can be 
used to formalize Roosevelt’s implicit model of political dynamics. It shows 
that there are good reasons to expect that people will care about promises made 
to them by others and that they will be willing to incur a cost to punish some- 
one who has made and broken a promise. The act of making, then breaking, a 
promise induces a taste for punishing the offender. 
A desire to express anger by voting against a politician can motivate some 
people to go to the polls and can influence how they vote, but there are many 
other factors that motivate voting. Someone may feel a sense of duty or may 
enjoy the satisfaction that comes from demonstrating to others that one is a 
good citizen. Nevertheless, if anger is a potential motivation, it may be a partic- 
ularly important one to study because it can be manipulated by politicians who 
behave strategically. 
If people are angrier when a promise has been broken, it is possible to give 
content to the notion of an entitlement. An entitlement is a set of transfer pay- 
ments that are bundled together  with an explicit, credible promise  from the 
government  about the duration  and level of future payments. If  a politician 
such as Roosevelt can create an entitlement for a large number of people, this 
decisively changes the subsequent political dynamics. If a successor reduces 
the payments under the entitlement program, this will induce anger and a taste 
for retribution in large numbers of voters. These voters will act on this taste by 
voting against the successor. 
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administration documented in section 7.6, provides direct support for the claim 
that creating a sense of entitlement was a paramount concern for the people 
who developed  the Social Security  system. Under  the assumption that they 
knew what they were doing, their actions offer indirect evidence that the hy- 
pothesized form of preferences with a built-in taste for punishment is correct. 
But there is also direct evidence that bears on the nature of preferences. Section 
7.5 points to evidence ranging from the behavior of animals, to experimental 
economics, to recent political developments, all of which support the notion 
that something like anger is an important source of motivation. The laboratory 
experiments are particularly relevant because they decisively refute the claim 
that statements about preferences cannot have scientific content. 
The questions addressed here in the context of the Social Security program 
are directly relevant  for other social policy issues. A positive analysis of  the 
policies that governments have adopted, or might adopt, in areas such as child 
care, education, health care, and long-term care must take account of the fact 
that government policies are outcomes from a political process. If we cannot 
understand the forces that have driven the politics of the relatively well estab- 
lished and relatively well studied Social Security program, there is little hope 
that we will be able to understand the politics of new areas of social policy. 
7.3  Voting and Preferences 
The probability that one vote will be decisive is very low in elections with 
realistic numbers of voters. Suppose that the number of people who will vote 
is equal to 2n + 1. Fix a particular voter, and assume that all other voters will 
vote in favor of a particular candidate with probability q. For simplicity, assume 
that this voter’s vote is decisive only in the case of a tie. The probability that 
the other 2n voters will split evenly between the two alternatives is 
2n! 
n!2  n=- q”(  1 -  4)”. 
For large values of n and values of q that differ from one-half, this probability 
is very small. 
The largest values for II arise in the case where q is equal to one-half, so 
that all other voters are equally likely to vote for or against this voter’s preferred 
candidate. Consider an election for a seat in the U.S. Senate in which the total 
number of other voters, 2n, is 2 million people. The probability of a tie is about 
.0004. In a presidential election in which 50 million people vote, the probabil- 
ity is reduced to .0001. If q differs from one-half, the values for Il are even 
smaller. Suppose that a voter has a prior probability distribution on the value 
of q that is uniform over the interval (.4, .6). Ex ante, the outcome in the elec- 
tion is still a toss-up, but now there is a reasonable chance that the actual vote 
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one hundred, (See Brennan and Buchanan  1984 for additional calculations 
along these lines.) 
Political theorists have long understood the problem that this poses for sim- 
ple theories of voter participation. Let U(y)  denote an indirect utility function 
defined over the disposable income y that is available to the consumer after all 
taxes or transfers from the government. If  people maximize U(y)  when they 
make their decision  about whether to vote, even a small cost from voting- 
something like $1-will  be orders of magnitude larger than the expected in- 
crease in y that comes from voting for the candidate who offers this voter the 
best package of taxes and transfers. 
Starting at least with Downs (1957), formal theorists have argued that there 
must be other components to the utility function that influence the decision to 
vote. In the terminology used here, they rely on an extended preference model, 
a model that  lets preferences  depend on arguments other than  the  standard 
consumption goods that are implicit in the function U(y).  Implicitly or explic- 
itly, they proceed  along the following lines: Let x denote the decision about 
whether to go to the polling station and W(x)  denote the utility from voting. If 
voters maximize U(y)  + W(x),  then the small cost of voting can be offset by 
the utility associated with this act. 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 1973) formalized this additional term in the 
utility function and gave it empirical content. They suggested,  for example, 
that a voter may care about the size of the margin by which a candidate wins. 
They use this observation to explain why, for example, many people bothered 
to vote for Lyndon Johnson in his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater. They 
also acknowledge that other aspects of preferences  like a sense of duty or a 
strong sense of affiliation with a particular political party may contribute to the 
direct satisfaction that a person gets from the act of voting. They provide evi- 
dence that their augmented model is consistent with the evidence, but as Barry 
(1970) notes, almost all of the explanatory power comes from the W(x)  term 
in the utility function. 
Fiorina (1976) takes this kind of analysis one step further. In his analysis, 
the utility  for a representative  voter may be written as U(y)  + W(a,  v). The 
variable a captures the party affiliation of the voter. Suppose that the absolute 
value of a represents the intensity of the identification and the sign represents 
the party, positive for Democrat and negative for Republican. Let v denote the 
candidate for whom the voter  voters,  with  v  =  1 representing  a  vote  for 
the Democratic candidate and v = -  1 a vote for the Republican. 
The act of going to the polling  station, x,  and the candidate for whom the 
voter votes,  v, both have an effect (albeit a very  small one) on the expected 
wealth of the consumer. Fiorina refers to these as the instrumental aspects of 
voting. He calls the effects that a and v have as arguments of W the expressive 
aspects of voting. He treats the party affiliation variable a as a state variable 
that is determined  by the voter’s history, one that is given at the time of an 
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there is an interaction  between a, and v  in the function W, a positive cross- 
partial derivative. If  v and a line up and if a is large in absolute value, then the 
utility from choosing to vote will be larger.  In everyday language, having a 
strong affiliation with a political party and voting for that party together make 
the act of going to the polls more satisfying. In the language of consumption 
theory, a and v are complements. 
As Aldrich (1993) concludes in his survey of the literature on voter partici- 
pation,  there is no escape from the conclusion  that, to understand  voting, it 
takes a broader theory of preferences. There is room for dispute about what 
the arguments of  W should be and about how strong the interaction  effects 
between these arguments and other choice variables might be. But there is no 
reasonable alternative to a term like W that depends on arguments other than 
wealth and conventional consumption. 
As a result, the remaining debate is not about the presence of a term like W, 
but  rather  about the nature  of  the  arguments of  this  function. On a prion 
grounds,  some theorists  follow Riker and Ordeshook, and maintain  that the 
utility function W depends only on the act of voting x, not on how the vote is 
cast. This approach uses  an extended  model of preferences  to explain why 
people vote, but it preserves the traditional instrumental theories about which 
alternative they vote for. Duty gets people to the polls, but once they are there, 
wealth maximization determines how they vote. 
The alternative is to follow Fiorina and allow for the possibility  that the 
extended  preference  approach is important  for understanding  not just why 
people vote but also how they vote. Other arguments besides the act of voting, 
x, enter in the function W,  arguments such as the vote choice v and party affili- 
ation a. If one starts from a general formulation that allows for the possibility 
that arguments other than wealth can influence how people vote, one then can 
use both theory and evidence to test assertions about W 
It is in this spirit that this paper considers additional arguments that could 
appear in the utility function. The variables considered in what follows capture 
the effects that promises and anger can have on how people vote. These vari- 
ables can coexist with more traditional variables like a sense of duty or party 
affiliation, but for simplicity these other variables are suppressed because they 
are not central to the analysis that follows. 
As Fiorina’s analysis shows, extended preference models can be tested like 
any other model. He finds evidence that affiliation does indeed influence voter 
turnout.  These  models are consistent  with  the  general  methodological  ap- 
proach of rational choice. As Aldrich emphasizes, they do not make political 
theory less interesting or reduce the degree to which strategic calculation plays 
a role in political outcomes. On the contrary, they explain important forms of 
strategic behavior by politicians that cannot be captured in the narrow prefer- 
ence models.  Economists who are interested  in positive theories  of politics 
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evaluating arguments in the utility function besides wealth when they engage 
in discussions of political econ~my.~ 
There is nothing unusual about this line of investigation. Despite occasional 
claims to the contrary, economists do consider both theory and evidence about 
the nature of human preferences. Two examples illustrate the issues involved. 
The first centers on intergenerational  altruism. For many  years,  economists 
treated altruistic acts between close kin in the same way that they treated altru- 
istic acts between people who are not related. Gifts from parents to children 
were lumped together with gifts from individuals who support public broad- 
casting. It was behavior that obviously took place, but it was placed outside 
the bounds of mainstream economists. 
It is hard to say exactly when the change took place, but over the course of 
the 1970s, economists changed views on gifts to close kin4  Before, the utility 
function of a parent could have as arguments only those goods that the parent 
directly consumed. By the end of the 1970s, the assumption that the consump- 
tion of children or their utility levels could also enter as arguments in the utility 
function of the parents passed largely without comment. There are empirical 
and theoretical debates about how strong this effect is and about what its impli- 
cations are in areas like public finance, but there is no longer any disagreement 
about the notion that a taste for altruism toward children is an inherent aspect 
of human preferences that economists can and should study. 
With a bit of a lag, this change followed the development of the notion of 
kin selection in evolutionary bi~logy.~  Because the biological basis for the eco- 
nomic theory of intergenerational altruism was rarely discussed in economics 
papers, it is difficult to trace the direct effects that developments in biology 
had on thinking in economics. Nevertheless,  it seems to have played an im- 
portant role. In a very short time, economists recognized that people had to 
have preferences  that  induced them  to give valuable  resources  to their  off- 
spring. Otherwise, we would not have survived as a species. 
In this period, what seems to have changed was the theory, not the evidence. 
Once economists had a theory about why preferences toward children should 
be the way they are, they proceeded to study the theoretical and empirical ques- 
tions that this new assumption about preferences raised. 
Another revealing example in economics arises in the context of preferences 
toward risk, and in this case it has been the evidence that has driven recent 
developments. Traditionally, economists relied on a mixture of introspection 
3. Some economists clearly are willing. See, for example, Brennan and Lomasky (1985). In a 
separate paper, Lomasky (1985) develops a different model of the political dynamics of Social 
Security. His claim is that voters get a small psychic benefit from voting for a program that they 
perceived to be a good program. 
4. Robert Barro’s article on  government debt (1974) seems to have marked a crucial turning 
point in the professional attitude toward this issue. 
5. William Hamilton published the pioneering paper on kin selection in  1964. 204  Paul M. Romer 
about the plausibility of various axioms and logical deduction to support vari- 
ous  assumptions about the  nature  of  preferences  over  risky  consumption 
bundles. For many years, the expected utility hypothesis was the only formal 
model  of such preferences,  but  in the last ten years, a variety  of alternative 
theories about preferences  have been proposed. In this case, the observation 
that the preferences  we observe must be the result of a process of biological 
evolution does little to guide our choice between the alternatives. Increasingly, 
what does help us choose is how well they account for the growing body of 
evidence that is emerging from laboratory experiments. (See Harless and Cam- 
erer 1994 and Hey and Orme 1994 for recent summaries of progress in testing 
the different assumptions about preferences.) 
If we ignore what economists say about the study of preferences and look at 
what they do, it is clear that they make progress in understanding preferences 
in the same way that they make progress in any other area-by  making use of 
theory and evidence. Theory plays an important role in delimiting the areas of 
investigation and setting the agenda for types of evidence to collect and study, 
but  it is the accumulation of evidence that ultimately  determines  which as- 
sumptions survive and achieve broad professional support. 
7.4  A Preference-Based Theory of Promises and Revenge 
As noted above, the aspects of preferences that seem to be  necessary  to 
understand Roosevelt’s model of politics relate to promises and punishments. 
People can threaten punishment for two distinct reasons. A person who has no 
underlying taste for imposing a punishment may consciously adopt a strategy 
that involves threats of punishment because the threats have strategic value. 
She may make good on the threats because they have instrumental value, in a 
repeated game, for example. Alternatively, a person can have a taste or desire 
for punishing others that is triggered by a particular sequence of events. In this 
case, a person carries out the threats because it is satisfying to do so. 
It is this second possibility that is relevant for the discussion that follows. 
Much of the behavior we observe, both in the field and in the laboratory, makes 
sense only if we admit that people sometimes have a taste for punishing others 
in particular circumstances. Most of the arguments that follow are directed at 
specifying just what these circumstances might be. But before turning to this 
issue, we must address the question of why a taste for punishing others might 
have evolved in humans. 
There are two reasons why people might have a hardwired taste for punish- 
ing others instead of a general-purpose cognitive capacity that lets them adopt 
threat strategies when they are useful. The first reason is that specialized, hard- 
wired mechanisms are relatively efficient at solving evolutionary design prob- 
lems. One of the reliable lessons from the study of artificial intelligence is that 
general  problem  solvers are very  slow and inefficient compared to special- 
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To illustrate  the practical implications  of this general lesson, consider the 
evolutionary problem of getting people to eat the right kinds of objects from 
their environment. Like other animals, we have hardwired tastes that guide this 
process. We could have been endowed with a preference for surviving and with 
general problem-solving  capabilities  for evaluating which objects to eat, but 
this would apparently  have been less efficient. (If this cognitive approach to 
deciding what to eat had efficiency advantages over the preference-based  ap- 
proach, all animals would have been under strong selection pressure to develop 
the kinds of brains that humans have.) Hardwired tastes let information about 
valuable  foods  accumulate across  many  generations.  Long  ago,  evolution 
stored the information that sweets and fats are good sources of calories some- 
where in the parts of our DNA that supply the code for our food preferences. 
If  we were  endowed only  with  a general  problem-solving  mechanism, we 
would have to start from scratch in each generation relearning this fact, or rely 
on extensive and time-consuming training from other members of the species 
to get this simple message across. 
Now consider the evolutionary problem of implementing a strategy such as 
tit  for tat  in  a repeated game. Humans could have been given the kind  of 
general-purpose cognitive capacities  that are assumed in most  of economic 
analysis and left to infer that this strategy (or some more complicated strategy) 
would be a good one to follow in a particular repeated game. Alternatively, 
they could have been given hardwired tastes that give them a desire to imple- 
ment the punishment phase of a strategy after an opponent behaves opportunis- 
tically. Repeated strategic  interaction  with other humans was surely  an im- 
portant  part  of  our  evolutionary  past.  A  taste  for  punishing  defection  or 
opportunism,  analogous to our taste for sweets and fat, might have emerged 
from the selection pressures that resulted from hundreds of thousands of years 
of social interaction in small hunter-gatherer bands. In a game against nature, 
parts of our strategy for eating are coded in preferences.  In a game against 
other people, parts of our strategy for cooperating and punishing might also be 
coded in preferences. 
There is a second reason why a hardwired taste for punishing others might 
be more valuable than a general cognitive capacity for making strategic calcu- 
lations. In some settings, a threat to punish someone who defects from cooper- 
ation will  not be credible. After  defection  takes place,  it may  not be in the 
interest of the person who issued the threat to carry through with the punish- 
ment. If someone has a strong taste for punishment that is triggered by defec- 
tion from cooperation, he will incur a cost to punish the defector in cases in 
which someone making cognitive calculations  might not.6 This kind of taste 
can support cooperation in circumstances such as one-shot games where coop- 
eration might otherwise be impossible. As a result, this taste can enhance sur- 
6. This explanation of emotion as a solution to commitment problems has been advanced by 
Frank (1988).  Hirshleifer (1987),  and Posner (1981), and no doubt by many others. 206  Paul M. Romer 
viva1 for the person who possesses it and for all members of a small band if 
they all possess it. 
It does not follow, however, that this kind of taste will necessarily evolve or 
that it will survive for long if it does evolve by chance. The problem here has 
been long recognized in discussions about the evolution of altruism. A popula- 
tion with preferences  that are beneficial to the group may be susceptible to 
entry by new individuals who have different kinds of preferences.  Someone 
who seems to have a taste for punishment, but does not have this taste, gets the 
deterrent value without ever having to pay the cost of punishing someone else.’ 
For the purposes of the arguments that follow, it does not matter which of 
these two reasons explains why the taste for punishing opportunism is hard- 
wired. All that matters is that the taste for punishing was built into our prefer- 
ences just as the taste for sweets and fats was. This matters because preferences 
presumably have changed very little in the last few thousand years, even as our 
economic environment has changed almost beyond recognition. Think again 
of  food preferences.  Our hardwired  tastes  for fats and sweets  still express 
themselves, even though many of us face serious health risks from consuming 
too many calories. In the same way, a taste for punishing others that evolved in 
circumstances where all social interactions took place in repeated encounters 
among small  numbers of  people may  now  express itself  in  circumstances 
where it too has no value. 
The role for promises then enters because a taste for punishing others may 
have been adaptive in some circumstances in our evolutionary past, but it may 
have been quite harmful in other circumstances. Ideally, people would be able 
to turn the taste for punishing opportunism on and off as appropriate for the 
situation. If tastes were invariant over time, this would pose a problem for a 
taste-based mechanism for solving problems of deterring opportunistic behav- 
ior. But tastes are not invariant. They can change over time. More specifically, 
they exhibit obvious state- or history-dependence.  Think again of food tastes. 
On top of our general tastes for sweets and fats, we have powerful mechanisms 
that induce history-dependence in our food tastes. For example, we form long- 
lasting aversions to strong tastes that we are exposed to before a bout of nausea. 
The extensive form game in figure 7.1 illustrates why it would be useful for 
the intensity of the taste for punishment to depend on the act by someone else 
of  making a promise. In  this  game, there are gains  from cooperation. De- 
pending on the magnitude of the parameter x, there may also be incentives for 
defection. This game can be interpreted as a food-sharing game that was played 
repeatedly  in our evolutionary past. It can be divided  into upper  and lower 
branches that are identical except for the terminal payoffs.  For the moment, 
ignore the initial decision by player  1 about whether to make a promise. Start 
at the point on each branch where player 2 can decide to share food or to pursue 
autarky. The only difference between these two branches is that the preferences 
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Fig. 7.1  Opportunism and punishment in a food-sharing game 
of player 2 are different. For now, treat them as separate games played by  1 
against different player 2s. 
Assume that player 2 has a large quantity of nonstorable food from a hunt. 
He can eat it all, or he can share half of it with player  1, who has no food in 
the initial period. In the next period, player 1 will catch a similar large quantity 
of food, and player 2 will have none. If they both eat their own catches, they 
each receive a baseline utility of 0. Suppose that player 2 decides to share his 
food. After collecting his prey, player  1 can then defect and eat it all or set 
some of it aside for player 2, who will arrive later. If player 1 sets aside some 
food for player 2, nature intervenes. With probability T,  a large animal comes 
and takes the food being stored for player 2.  Assume that IT  is small. 
If player 2 comes back and there is food for him, both players are better off 
than  they  would  be  if  they  had  not  shared the  food. They get  the payoffs 
(1, 1) instead of the baseline payoffs (0,O) because they can smooth their food 
consumption and eat after both hunts.  If, on the other hand, player 2 comes 
back and there is no food for him, he faces a decision about whether to punish 
player  I.  The dashed line connecting the two nodes indicates that player 2 can- 
not tell whether player  1 did not share or player  1 did share and the random 
draw from nature was bad. If  he does inflict a punishment, for example by 
starting a fight, this imposes a direct cost p on both players. 
The player 2 on the top branch has a taste for punishment that is indicated 
by the additional term r (for revenge) in his payoffs. Player 2 gets this psychic 
payoff  when  he  inflicts  punishment  on player  1 in circumstances  in  which 
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venge after they have successfully cooperated, but in this case there would be 
no psychic payoff r;  and player 2 would not choose to punish. Along the lower 
branch, player 2 never feels satisfaction from punishing player  1, even in cases 
in which things have turned out badly for him because of a bad draw by nature. 
Throughout, we will maintain  the assumption that r is greater than p  and 
that p is larger than x -  1. This means that the taste for punishment is strong 
enough to give the player 2  on the top branch  of the game an  incentive to 
punish player 1, even though doing so inflicts a cost p on himself. It also means 
that punishment deters opportunism. 
In this game, the critical parameter is x, the payoff for player  1 when  he 
defects. Consider first a case in which x is smaller than the payoff of  1 that 
player 1 gets from cooperation. (Imagine, for example, that the amount of food 
from each hunt is twice what one person can eat and that refraining from shar- 
ing imposes direct costs on player  1.) In this case, player  1 will always want to 
cooperate. If the probability T  of a bad draw from nature is small, both players 
will prefer the cooperative outcome in which each player shares. Player 2 will 
suffer occasional losses because of bad draws from nature, but the gains from 
cooperation outweigh these costs. In this case, the players clearly want to play 
along the lower branch. This avoids punishments when draws from nature are 
bad. 
Now consider the case in which the payoff x is larger than  1. The best state 
of affairs for both players would be to play along the upper branch. It is better 
for both players if player 2 has a taste for revenge. In the absence of a taste for 
revenge, it is no longer possible to sustain cooperation when x is large. This is 
bad for both players, for they both are stuck with the autarky payoffs (0,  0). 
If they could sustain cooperation, the sharing payoffs (1,  1) will occur with 
probability  1 -  T,  and the unfortunate outcome with punishment, which gen- 
erates payoffs of (1 -  p, -  1 -  p  + r)  will arise with probability T.  If T  is not 
too large, both players would prefer the cooperative outcome to the autarky 
outcome. 
With the exception of r, all of the payoffs in this game have a direct positive 
effect on survival. They can be thought of as being measured in units of calo- 
ries of food energy. The psychic payoff r that player 2 sometimes enjoys from 
punishing player  1 has no direct positive effect on survival. The point of the 
arguments given above is that this taste for punishment can have an indirect 
effect that is positive because it deters player 1 from abandoning the strategy 
of cooperation. This is the case when x is greater than  1. Any costs associated 
with carrying out the punishments might therefore be outweighed by the gains. 
The point illustrated by  the game in the figure is that the comparison might 
also go the other way. When x is less than  1, both players will be better off if 
player 2 has no taste for punishment. In this kind of world, the ideal arrange- 
ment would be for player 2 to have a taste for punishment that is activated only 
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kind of contingent behavior under the assumption that a taste for punishment 
is hardwired into preferences. 
Faced with these different possible values for x, it is in the interest of both 
players to find a way to selectively “turn on” the taste for punishment in player 
2.  One way to do so is suggested by the first stage of play by player  1. Moving 
back to this stage, the game suggests that communication between the players 
in the initial  stage can influence the preferences  that player 2 ultimately ex- 
presses.  Specifically, if  player  1 says to player 2 that he promises that some 
food will be available after the second hunt, this statement by itself could acti- 
vate the taste for revenge in player 2. Suppose that the full game starts with 
player  1 making a promise to player 2, so now we are on the upper branch. If 
player 2 arrives to find no food after player  1 has promised that food will be 
there, player 2 may have a strong sense of having been wronged and a strong 
desire for revenge. This sense and this desire might be absent if player 2 arrived 
at the  same node  on the lower branch;  that is, player 2 might not  feel  any 
taste for revenge  if  he finds no food  after unilaterally deciding  to share, in 
circumstances in which player 1 has made no promise about whether he will re- 
ciprocate. 
Because of the assumption that p is large enough to deter defection by player 
1 and that r is even larger so that the threat of punishment is credible along the 
upper branch, cooperation can be sustained after player 1 has made his prom- 
ise.  Because n is small but  positive,  there  will  occasionally  be  misunder- 
standings, cases when player 2 imposes punishments even though player 1 has 
cooperated. Nevertheless, it may be a cost worth paying if the gains from coop- 
eration are high. 
Of course, if n  were too high or if x were low, player  1 could simply refrain 
from making a promise that he might not be able to keep. That is the value of 
a mechanism that makes the taste for punishment contingent not just on a bad 
outcome for the person who expresses this taste, but also on an act like a prom- 
ise by his partner. It lets the players avoid invoking the revenge mechanism in 
states where it would not be helpful, but lets them turn it on in cases where it 
would  be  helpful. If  the gains from cooperation  are high, and  if  situations 
where deterring opportunism is frequently an important issue, it would be ad- 
vantageous to be a person like player 2. 
The discussion here has been given in the context of a one-shot game. The 
implied advantage of the hardwired taste for preferences is the second of the 
two advantages noted  above. These preferences make some kinds of threats 
credible. As has already been noted, it is an open question whether these kinds 
of preferences could have emerged from the process of human evolution. Alter- 
natively, this one-shot game could be embedded in a repeated game. In this 
case, the taste for punishing others might simply be a mechanism for imple- 
menting a particular Nash equilibrium strategy in the repeated game. Regard- 
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how people with these kinds of preferences might behave when they are put 
into the evolutionarily novel context of an industrial democracy. 
This story seems to violate the useful methodological assumption that con- 
sumer preferences are stable. However, it is possible to specify a utility func- 
tion that is stable. The strategy is the same as the one followed by the early 
political scientists, to include additional arguments in the utility function. Let 
promise denote the action of player 1 in the first round. It takes on the value of 
“make a promise” or “do nothing.” Let food indicate what player 2 observes 
when he comes to collect his food after the second hunt. Let punish denote the 
act by player 2 in the last stage. It can take on the values “inflict punishment” 
or “do nothing.” Finally, let c represent survival-related payoffs, measured as 
before in calorie equivalents. Under the assumptions used so far, the amount 
of food that player 2 gets to eat, the timing of when he gets to eat it, and the 
punishment  he inflicts will all affect c. In a way that is symmetrical with the 
preferences  that reflect voter affiliation  that were used  above, the stationary 
utility function for player 2 can be written in the form U(c) + W(food,  pun- 
ish,  promise). 
This utility function is an example of what Gary Becker has called metapref- 
erences. As Becker has argued in his development of the extended-preference 
approach to human behavior, the crucial assumptions about metapreferences 
are concerned with cross derivatives.* In traditional economic language, these 
are assumptions about complementarity. They are analogous to the assumption 
noted above, about complementarity  between party affiliation and voter tum- 
out. The crucial  assumption  in the analysis here is that  W does not increase 
when punish increases unless promise takes the value “made a promise” and 
food takes on the value “no food available.” 
The approach followed here is closely related to the work on fairness by 
Rabin ( 1993) and the underlying theory of psychological games outlined by 
Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989). In a more formal and more gen- 
eral setting, these papers pursue the goal of introducing new, empirically rele- 
vant arguments into the utility function of economic agents. Rabin, in particu- 
lar,  tries  to  develop  an  explanation  for punishment  and  its  mirror  image, 
reciprocal altruism, in a one-shot game. In Rabin’s model, the payoffs that an 
agent receives and the strategies that the player adopts are functions not only 
of the underlying  material payoffs (the payoffs  that are measured in calories 
here) but also of beliefs that a player has about the motivations of other players. 
Technically, the description of the game outlined in this paper avoids the intro- 
duction of beliefs or intentions  and makes the payoffs  a function of actions 
(making a promise) and observables (finding no food). These actions have the 
unusual property that they have no effect on material (i.e., calorie) payoffs. 
8. For examples in this line of work, see Stigler and Becker (1977) on the general approach; 
Becker and Murphy (1988) and Becker, Grossman, and Murphy  (I  994) on addiction; Becker and 
Murphy (1993) on advertising; Becker and Mulligan (1993) on the endogenous discount rates; 
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The alternative approach pursued  in Rabin’s work  lets preferences  depend 
on the intentions of the other agent and allows actions and observables to mat- 
ter only to the extent that they  signal intentions. This deeper strategy intro- 
duces fundamental conceptual issues that have not yet been fully resolved. It 
would make it possible to deal with deeper questions about how our own cog- 
nitive inferences about the intentions behind the acts of others interact with 
our preferences. Once this richer style of analysis is fully developed, the argu- 
ments in this paper based on actions alone can presumably be extended to take 
advantage of it. 
7.5  Evidence on Extended Preferences 
The prediction from the model outlined above is that people have a taste for 
revenge that can be activated or primed by an act like a promise. The taste can 
then be triggered by an opportunistic act or by an outcome that is interpreted 
as an indicator of an opportunistic act. The theoretical arguments try to suggest 
that this kind  of  assumption  does not blatantly  contradict  basic  facts about 
selection. They suggest that the hypothesized form of preferences could have 
had survival value relative to standard preferences that do not exhibit a state- 
dependent taste for retribution. But this kind of abstract argument can only get 
one so far. The theory  should be understood  primarily  as a justification  for 
looking at the evidence to see whether humans do have a taste for revenge, and 
whether it is contingent on acts such as a promise made by others followed by 
subsequent opportunism. 
There is abundant direct evidence suggesting that people do have a taste for 
revenge. For example, after surveying the available evidence from ethnograph- 
ies, Daly and Wilson (1988) conclude that “lethal retribution is an ancient and 
cross-culturally  universal  recourse”  for  people  who  have  been  seriously 
harmed  by  others.  In  modern  societies, the individual  desire for revenge  is 
suppressed by the state, but vestiges of it still show through. People pay money 
to play video games that simulate the experience of being attacked and taking 
violent revenge. They also pay to watch movies in which someone the audience 
cares about gets hurt by  some bad person. The emotional payoff comes from 
watching the bad person suffer a violent punishment in the end. There is also 
evidence suggesting that a taste for revenge is present in nonhuman primates 
such as chimpanzees (see, for example, de Waal  1989, 205-7).  People who 
study animal behavior call this behavior  “moralistic aggression”  and distin- 
guish it from other kinds of aggression. A key stimulus for this type of behavior 
is the failure by one animal to reciprocate after the other has been helpful. 
Recent  political  developments  offer  indirect  evidence  that  bears  on  the 
model  outlined  here.  Following  the  1994 midterm  elections, exit polls and 
most postelection  analysis  both  suggest that anger was  a potent  motivating 
factor in this election. In contrast to the recent downward trend, turnout nation- 
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to 38.7%. In the notably nasty race between Oliver North and Charles Robb, 
turnout was up a remarkable  16%. 
As the experience with expected utility theory suggests, the best cross-check 
on a theory about preferences is evidence from controlled experiments. At least 
one experiment designed to test for expressive aspects of voting behavior has 
been  attempted  (Carter and Guerette  1992). As the authors note, the results 
from this particular experiment are unclear because of problems in the experi- 
mental design, but presumably better experiments can be constructed. One of 
the advantages of a theory that can be stated explicitly in terms of actions and 
payoffs in a game form is that it is possible to play the game in a controlled 
laboratory setting and observe the outcomes. So far, the precise game outlined 
above has yet to be tested in an experiment, but in principle it could be. Mean- 
while, we can take advantage of related experiments that were developed for 
different reasons but  that bear directly  on the extended-preference  approach 
outlined here. 
The most relevant evidence comes from the Ultimatum game and its close 
relative, the Dictator game.9  The Dictator game is very simple. Player 1 is given 
the opportunity to divide a fixed sum of money s between herself and an un- 
known player 2. After the money is divided, the players take their shares, and 
the game is over. The prediction from most economic models is that player  1 
will take all of the money. This is in fact what happens, if the game is set up 
to assure player  1 that her choice will not be known to anyone else. The evi- 
dence suggests that people prefer more money to less but that they also care 
about what others think of their behavior. 
The Ultimatum game adds a second stage in which player 2 has a chance to 
respond. In this game, player  1 gets to propose a split of the amount s. In the 
second stage, player 2 can accept or reject the proposed  split. If player 2 ac- 
cepts, the players are given the amounts proposed by player 1. If player 2 rejects 
the split, both players receive nothing. In a representative version of the experi- 
ment, the total amount to be split is $10 and the splits must be made in units 
of $1. The traditional narrow-preference model makes an unambiguous predic- 
tion about the outcome of the Ultimatum game. Player  I  will propose a split 
that gives $1, the smallest allowable positive unit of money to player 2. Player 
2 will then accept the proposed  split because some money is preferred to no 
money. The game is of interest to economists because the prediction is so clear- 
cut and repeated experiments have shown that the observed behavior is sig- 
nificantly different from the prediction. Many of the offers proposed by player 
1 are close to 50-50  splits. For the purposes of the discussion here, the interest- 
ing observation  is that player 2 will often reject a split that differs too much 
from a 50-50  split, even if it means giving up several dollars of income. 
The rejections  by  player  2 fit naturally  in the framework  outlined  above. 
Player 2 has a taste for revenge that is triggered by  opportunistic behavior by 
9. For a summary of  results from experiments with the Dictator game and the Ultimatum game, 
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player  1. It is worth  sacrificing a few dollars to be able to punish a player  1 
who behaves opportunistically  and demands too much. It is interesting to note 
that people assigned the role of player  1 also seem to have the right model of 
the behavior of player 2.  When they are given an anonymous opportunity to 
take all the money in the Dictator game, they do so significantly more often. 
But when they play the Ultimatum game, they restrain themselves because they 
know that player 2 will punish them if they push too hard. 
Some economists who would like to preserve the narrow-preference model 
have criticized these kinds of experiments by saying that the stakes in the typi- 
cal experiment are small and by claiming that other kinds of behavior should 
emerge when the stakes are larger. This is an easy proposition to test. At least 
for the Ultimatum game, the available evidence suggests that the stakes do not 
matter. The behavior is about the same when people divide $100 as when they 
divide $10. The irony in this charge is that it is sometimes made by economists 
who support instrumental  explanations of voting, where the stakes are many 
orders of magnitudes smaller. 
If the model of the taste for revenge that is outlined above is correct, people 
should be sensitive to the actions that do not have any direct effect on material 
payoffs.  Other experiments suggest that this is the case. For example, if it is 
revenge rather than a general sense of fairness that motivates the rejections in 
the second round, player 2 should be less likely to reject an uneven split if it is 
the result of a random device rather than a choice made by player  1. Results in 
Blount  ( 1994) confirm this prediction.  Other aspects of the general  context 
may also be relevant. For example, if one of the two players earns the right to 
be the divider (for example by winning a trivia contest in an earlier round of 
play), the dividers ask for a large share of the total, and the second-round play- 
ers acquiesce. Davis and Holt summarize these kinds of results by saying that 
“economically irrelevant procedural details can have a significant effect on the 
bargaining behavior, especially when such details alter the perceived symme- 
try of the situation” (1993, 267). According to the model from the last section, 
what these  “economically irrelevant procedural  details”  are doing is turning 
up or down the intensity of the taste for revenge. That is, they are providing 
clues about the nature of the strategic interaction that will take place. Our emo- 
tional commitment mechanisms are sensitive to these clues. In these terms, we 
can give a new interpretation  to the game in figure 7.1. It predicts  that the 
outcome will depend very strongly on the economically irrelevant procedural 
detail of whether player  1 makes a promise at the start of play. Of course, this 
kind of detail is economically irrelevant only if one takes a very narrow view of 
preferences and assumes that a promise does not influence anyone’s behavior. 
7.6  The History of the Social Security Program 
The most striking aspect of the history of the Social Security system is the 
remarkable amount of attention that all sides devoted to issues that most econo- 
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spect, it is clear that the small core of people  who led the Social Security 
system through its first four decades had a more acute awareness of the politi- 
cal salience of these details and were more successful at manipulating them to 
their advantage. But from a very early stage, at least some of the critics of the 
system also recognized that the implicit and explicit promises hidden in these 
details would determine the political future of the Social Security system. 
Because of a historical accident, we have detailed evidence about how calcu- 
lated the attempt was to build up the insurance imagery that was at the heart 
of the strategy for making Social Security benefits into an entitlement. The 
architects of  the system feared a Supreme Court challenge to an explicit at- 
tempt by  the federal government to set up a retirement  system. Because the 
federal government clearly has the power to raise taxes and make  spending 
decisions, the Social Security Act of 1935 described a new system of payroll 
taxation and a set of old-age benefits that would be paid to some citizens. The 
act never makes any explicit link between  these two parts. Words like insur- 
ance and contribution do not appear. 
At the time of the 1938 Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitution- 
ality of  the 1935 act, Wilbur Cohen was working as an aid to Robert Altmeyer, 
the chairman of the Social Security Board. Cohen was perhaps the most im- 
portant person in the development of the system. He was a central participant 
in all the major developments of the system from the time of its creation up 
through his participation on the Greenspan commission in the 1980s. He later 
recalled his reaction to the Supreme Court decision upholding the constitution- 
ality of the 1935 act. “I recall walking down the steps of the Supreme Court 
building in a glow of ecstasy. . . .  When I got back to the office I obtained Mr. 
Altmeyer’s approval to send out a memo to the staff stating that because of the 
decision, we could now call the old age benefits program ‘old age insurance.’ 
. . . The American public was and still is insurance-minded  and  opposed to 
welfare,  ‘the dole,’ and ‘handouts”’ (quoted in Derthick 1979, 199). 
Cates (1983, 32-33)  uses excerpts from public information  pamphlets to 
illustrate how the system’s rhetoric changed immediately  after the Supreme 
Court decision was handed down: 
[From a 1937 pamphlet produced before the Supreme Court decision] 
The United States Government will send checks every month to retired 
workers  . . .  under the old-age benefit plan. . . .  The same law that provides 
these benefits for you and other workers sets up certain new taxes to be paid 
to the United States Government. 
[From a 1938 pamphlet written after the decision] 
Your  [Social Security card] shows that you  have  an insurance account 
with the U.S. Government-Federal  old age and survivors insurance. This 
is a national  insurance plan for all workers in commerce and industry. . . . 
taxes are like the premium on any other kind of insurance. 
Achenbaum  (1986,  35) observes that Roosevelt  himself  participated  in  this 
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holders of a private  insurance  company.” The Social Security Amendments 
passed  by  the Congress  in  1939 made the changes in terminology  that had 
already been implemented within the Social Security bureaucracy official. At 
the insistence of the program  officials within  the agency, the insurance  lan- 
guage was incorporated  into the law. The Old-Age Reserve Account  estab- 
lished in the 1935 act was renamed the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust 
Fund. The original taxes were repealed and the new insurance “contributions” 
were  imposed  under  the  Federal  Insurance  Contributions  Act  (FICA). As 
Achenbaum observes, “[Alny dispassionate analysis of the  1939 debate over 
social security must recognize that there was a gap between what policymakers 
were doing and what they said.” 
It was this gap that Curtis threatened to expose to broad public view with 
his hearings  on the Chamber  of  Commerce’s plan.  Altmeyer, who had just 
stepped down as the commissioner of social security, wrote to Representative 
Curtis refusing to appear before his committee. He accused Curtis of being 
hostile to the entire concept of social security, noting that “you contend that 
[the] old-age and survivors insurance system is not insurance, although  it is 
so designated in the law itself.” Altmeyer eventually  was subpoenaed. In his 
responses to questions from the committee, he eventually admitted that some 
of the language about a “contract” between beneficiaries  and the government 
was misleading. After the hearings, the literature distributed by the Social Se- 
curity system did tone down some of  its insurance rhetoric (Cates  1983, 84). 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable how consistent and persistent the early leaders of 
the program continued to be in their defense of the insurance imagery. Derthick 
(1979, 199) reports the following testimony by Cohen before the U.S. Senate 
in 1961: 
Senator Wallace E  Bennett. My idea of a contribution is something that  I 
myself take out of my pocket and hand to somebody. It is not, it does not 
apply to what somebody else takes out of my pocket, and I think this is a 
tax. . . 
Mc Cohen. You have to change the law then because it says it is the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act. 
Unfortunately for Cohen, there was someone at those hearings who had heard 
this justification before and knew the history of how the insurance language 
got into the law. 
Senator Curl T. Curtis. Who told us to do that, Wilbur? I remember the day 
it happened. 
MI:  Cohen. I think it was a good idea, Mr. Curtis. 
In the end, the repeated conservative attacks on the logic of the position that 
the Social Security proponents adopted seem to have had little effect. There is 
certainly no evidence that they changed the political  debate surrounding the 
program. The conservatives seemed to have missed the deeper significance of 
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cal battle, it did not work to fight rhetoric with logic. It was not the logic of the 
arguments made by  leaders of the Social Security system that influenced the 
behavior of voters. It was the promise itself that changed the behavior of the 
listeners. Logic had nothing to do with it. 
In a vague and indirect fashion, Cohen himself tried to make this point in a 
1971 debate with Milton Friedman: “Mr. Friedman calls a lot of the things he 
doesn’t like about the social security system rhetoric. And that gets me to a 
point that I want to stress. My point is that economists do not determine all of 
the choices and options and attitudes prevailing in this nation. People do live 
by rhetoric. . . .  True, if you are an economist, you may exclude all matters of 
politics from your thinking. But to do so is not reality” (Cohen and Friedman 
From the beginning in 1935 until the mid-l970s, the Social Security system 
underwent a process of steady and significant expansion. To the original retire- 
ment benefits, benefits for surviving spouses and children were added in 1939. 
The coverage  of the  system  and the level of benefits  were  substantially in- 
creased  in  1950. Disability  benefits  were  the  most  important  direction  for 
expansion during the rest  of  the  1950s. After disability coverage was intro- 
duced in  1956, planning for coverage of medical expenses began within the 
Social Security Administration. The Eisenhower administration then in power 
did not support the extension of the system to cover medical care, but work on 
the various plans proceeded and eventually culminated in the Medicare legisla- 
tion of the mid-1960s. The push for increased cash benefits-the  next prior- 
ity-culminated  in the substantial benefit increase of 1972. 
Along the way, the possibility of retiring with reduced benefits at age sixty- 
two was added, and the coverage of the system was steadily expanded. Origi- 
nally, planners anticipated that the combined tax on workers and firms of less 
than 6% would be sufficient to finance the system when it was fully mature. 
We have now reached a level of more than  15% on a much higher real wage 
base, and it has probably not reached its maximum. There is genuine uncer- 
tainty about how high the tax rate might have to go to cover the large benefit 
payments that will be required when the baby boom generation begins to retire 
in the third decade of the next century. 
This remarkable pattern of consistent expansion was made possible in large 
part because program advocates and sympathetic politicians were able to make 
long-term, self-fulfilling  promises about future tax and benefit payments. At 
each stage in the expansion, the advocates were able to commit the government 
to an upward-sloping time profile of new benefit payments and an even steeper 
upward-sloping profile of tax obligations. Because the initial increase in bene- 
fits was larger than the initial increase in taxes, the initial stages of expansion 
were generally popular and posed little political risk. 
A crucial element in this program of expansion was the ability of decision 
makers to tie the hands of future politicians. When the full cost of previously 
enacted benefits eventually became apparent-when  previously scheduled tax 
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increases went into effect or expenditures exceeded revenues and some kind 
of adjustment had  to be made-there  was always a risk that policy  makers 
would  respond  by  cutting back on benefits  instead  of  implementing  the re- 
quired tax increases. This is why the ability to create a sense of entitlement 
was so important. At every  stage, the proponents of expansion were able to 
promise that a given level of benefits would be paid. And merely by  making 
that promise, they were able to make it come true. When they told people that 
they had earned their benefits  as a matter of right, people believed  them. If 
those rights were threatened, they reacted with anger. When the Reagan admin- 
istration finally proposed in 198  1 that Social Security benefits be cut, primarily 
through a 25% reduction in the benefits available for early retirement, everyone 
learned how politically potent these promises were.  '(I 
7.7  Conclusion 
Some economists and political scientists use the tools of economics to for- 
mulate positive models of political action. This is a difficult area, so it is no 
slander on people who have worked there to claim that there is room for im- 
provement.  Many other economists  have taken  the seemingly easier path of 
normative analysis. By examining various kinds of market failures, these econ- 
omists claim to identify policies that would permit efficiency gains if they were 
adopted. Without making any claims about which policies are adopted, these 
economists identify policies that should be adopted. That is, they claim that if 
the identified policies were adopted, it would be possible to make everyone 
better off. Even this kind of analysis must ultimately confront deeper questions 
about preferences. 
Imagine that economists really  were philosopher kings. Imagine that they 
could  bypass  the  political  system,  draw  up  policies,  and  implement  them. 
Small, seemingly irrelevant  details like the difference between  transfer pay- 
ments and entitlements might ultimately have a very big impact on the prefer- 
ences, and therefore on the behavior, of the citizens in a nation. One of the 
puzzles noted in the beginning was that the typical elderly widow who was not 
eligible for survivors benefits  did not participate  in the debate about Social 
Security in the  1950s. But this was  perfectly  rational  behavior. She had no 
ability to influence the outcome. At that time, she also lacked any sense that 
she had been wronged-that  promises had been made and not kept-so  she 
had no taste for writing angry letters, protesting, or making a special effort to 
vote against the people who opposed a plan that would have given her a wind- 
fall. As the prologue  reminds  us, sixty years  ago policy  makers were  con- 
strained because many poor people refused to accept assistance payments from 
the government. Today, we face a different constraint. Large numbers of afflu- 
ent old people are primed for action, ready to explode in a spasm of anger at 
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any suggestion  that the transfer payments they receive from the government 
be reduced. 
The arguments presented here suggest that this change in the preferences or 
values of large numbers of people was an inevitable, intentional side effect of 
the way that the Social Security program was designed and implemented by 
the Roosevelt administration. This change in values represents a possible cost 
of the policies adopted then. Many people count the redistribution  of income 
that the Social Security program achieved among the most important accom- 
plishments  of social policy  in the United  States. For them, this benefit may 
very  well outweigh any  costs associated  with  increased  public  perceptions 
about entitlement. For others, the costs of the program may seem too high. The 
point here is that it is not possible to weigh all the costs and benefits of this 
program or any other policy program without taking account of all of its ef- 
fects, including its effects on values and politics. 
Important, long-lasting changes in values and behavior might follow from 
proposed government programs in the areas such as health care and long-term 
care. Economists  who focus only on incidence may see little difference  be- 
tween an employer mandate and a worker mandate concerning health care cov- 
erage. The long-run effects of these two arrangements might nevertheless be 
very different. They could induce very different beliefs about individual re- 
sponsibility and entitlement, and these could substantially affect voting, future 
policy debates, and the other aspects of social life in important ways. 
Presumably, even an economist who ignores how policies get adopted, who 
is engaged only in  a purely  normative analysis of  the costs and benefits of 
various policies, would want to take account of the effects that these policies 
can have on values. Changes in values are one of the outcomes that the citizens 
of a nation care about, both for their own sake and because of the secondary 
effects they can induce. Economists who are interested in the positive analysis 
of politics and political economy will be particularly interested in how these 
changes in values influence subsequent political dynamics. 
The goal of shaping values was arguably the driving motivation behind the 
widespread adoption of the most important social policy in the early history of 
the United States-mandatory  attendance at public schools. Hunches and dim 
intuitions about the effects that policies have on values are driving the current 
debate about welfare reform. Questions about values are beginning to be ad- 
dressed in discussions of reform of social welfare programs in Europe (Lind- 
beck  1994). Other economists have noted how much richer our policy advice 
would  be if  we could address  questions  about  values  (Aaron 1994; Aaron, 
Mann, and Taylor 1994).  What is missing is not the will or the interest but the 
tools with which to begin an analysis of values. 
There are many subtleties and ambiguities that need to be explored if we are 
to study values, but several things are clear: State-dependent  preferences that 
allow for arguments capturing a broad  range of actions or beliefs about the 
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tions about values. As Becker’s analysis suggests, this framework can make 
use of conventional tools such as a stable underlying utility function and com- 
plementarity  between  different  arguments in this function.  In  principle, the 
study of values need not be any more difficult conceptually than the study of 
party affiliation in the analysis of turnout. What we need to do is identify state 
variables analogous to party affiliation that capture what we mean by values, 
and begin to study how these variables affect other choices. There is also rea- 
son to hope that continued experimentation in the laboratory will slowly accu- 
mulate a rich body of evidence that can be used to test all theories about prefer- 
ences, including ones about the deeper preferences we label values. Given the 
importance of the topic and the potential for headway, it would be a shame if 
economists held back from pursuing these questions because of a misconcep- 
tion about what constitutes good science when we study people. 
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Comment  Roger G.  NOH 
Paul Romer’s essay has three objectives: to develop an economic theoretic ex- 
planation  for why a genetic predisposition  to vengeful behavior has survival 
value for the human species; to apply the theory of revenge as a conditional 
argument of an individual’s utility function to voting behavior; and to explore 
the implications of this type of behavior with respect to the politics of Social 
Security. The specific line of reasoning in the paper proceeds as follows: hu- 
mans are genetically predisposed to derive utility from revenge when another 
human abrogates an agreement to cooperate; legislative entitlements are analo- 
gous to bilateral cooperative agreements; and hence attempts to roll back enti- 
tlements would trigger vengeful  responses  by  voters. This reasoning is then 
used to explain  why  Republicans  proposed,  and Democrats rejected, an at- 
tempt to reorganize Social Security as a universal old-age assistance program. 
According to Romer, the Republicans cleverly proposed these changes in the 
hopes that they would make Social Security easier to kill in the future, and the 
Democrats equally cleverly  saw through  this strategy  and so opposed what 
would seemingly be part of their agenda-to  expand the coverage of transfer 
payments. 
Romer’s work  is an example of both the strengths and the weaknesses of 
what scholars in other disciplines have called “economics imperialism.” The 
term refers to the invasion of the provinces of other social sciences-anthro- 
pology, political science, psychology, and sociology-by  economists applying 
their toolkit of optimizing decision-theory models to traditional problems of 
other disciplines, and claiming to provide simpler, better, more comprehensive 
explanations than have been supplied by generations of scholars in sister fields. 
Much of the criticism  of the exportation  of economic methodology  to other 
fields is defensive and wrong-headed, reflecting a lack of understanding about 
decision-theoretic  models. But some of this criticism is on target. Economists 
frequently do overinterpret their results (most commonly, interpreting a quali- 
tative, partial-equilibrium  finding as a dominant, if not comprehensive, expla- 
nation for an observed phenomenon). And economists are notorious for ignor- 
ing previous research on the same issue by noneconomists and for testing their 
theories against a null hypothesis of chaos (e.g., the absence of a competing 
explanation) rather  than against  other plausible explanations  that have been 
developed by scholars in other disciplines. 
The Core Theory 
The core of Romer’s paper is a game-theoretic explanation of how natural 
selection favors humans who are willing to make and accept promises for co- 
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operation but who, when a promise is abrogated, derive personal satisfaction 
from extracting an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. The novelty in Romer’s 
conceptual model is the intertemporal asymmetry of the cooperation: the sacri- 
fices and rewards of the parties to an agreement are not distributed in the same 
way  over time. Regarding Social Security, a working-age adult interprets the 
entitlement feature of the program as an intertemporal commitment to reward 
current sacrifice (the payroll tax on current wages) with a proportional pension 
upon retirement at some time in the distant future. 
Romer’s core theoretical model is an interesting contribution to an important 
and influential  body of literature about, to use Robert Axelrod’s provocative 
term, the “evolution of cooperation.” This literature as much as any demon- 
strates  the best  of  multidisciplinary  research,  and  convincingly  refutes  the 
wrong-headed critics of the application of optimizing models outside of eco- 
nomics. Moreover, scholars from many disciplines have made important con- 
tributions, including political scientists (e.g., Axelrod), philosophers (e.g., Jon 
Elster), sociologists (e.g., James Coleman), and, of course, many economists. 
To say that Romer has contributed to this literature is not a small compliment. 
My concern about Romer’s essay is his exuberance in using his theory to 
explain voting behavior and its policy implications regarding entitlement pro- 
grams. Romer’s core accomplishment is really a “possibility theorem” in that 
it demonstrates that one among many human emotions could motivate behavior 
that, while seemingly irrational on the surface, is rational because it leads to 
mutually beneficial  cooperation  among  egoistic actors. Stated this way,  the 
model illustrates a standard game-theoretic result: a commitment to irrational 
out-of-equilibrium  behavior  supports the cooperatively rational equilibrium. 
Romer’s twist, of course, is the suggestion that genetic preprogramming twid- 
dles our utility functions in a way that makes the irrational out-of-equilibrium 
action in fact rational because we derive pleasure from entering the punishment 
phase of a cooperative game. 
A single-effect, single-cause plausibility argument of this form suffers from 
two pitfalls. The first is that it borders on tautology: assume a level of utility, 
R, from punishing a defector that is sufficient to prevent most defectors from 
defecting, but is not so large that humans regularly  bash  each other for the 
slightest disappointment. Romer escapes the tautology by invoking sociobiol- 
ogy: because humans survived, R, like Baby Bear’s porridge, must have been 
just right. The second is that it ignores all but one dimension of human motiva- 
tion and behavior. Two others that come immediately to mind are altruism and 
rational foresight. 
First, humans seem to have interdependent  utility functions (i.e., they are 
quasi-altruistic).  Thus,  one  alternative  to  revenge  as  the  mechanism  that 
polices the fulfillment of  promises  is that humans  actually care about each 
other enough not to renege on promises when doing so is not too costly (Harsa- 
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from altruistic behavior are enormous (Monroe’s conclusion based on her study 
of Germans who protected Jews during the Holocaust). ’ Altruistic theories can 
also be defended on evolutionary grounds as attributes that enhance the surviv- 
ability of the human species. 
Second, the key to human survivability as a species, given that we are slow, 
weak,  soft, clawless,  long in  maturing,  and tasty, may  be that  we are good 
problem  solvers who,  among animals, are exceedingly  unlikely  to  let auto- 
nomic emotional drives dictate our behavior. Moreover, humans probably are 
smart enough to recognize that life is a repeated  game and that fulfilling  a 
promise today enables one to make a similar beneficial agreement tomorrow. 
The advantage of this view of humans is that it avoids the fatalistic inexorabil- 
ity of genetic theories,  leaving room for true choice and learning. The chal- 
lenge to Romer is not just to demonstrate that revenge can explain cooperation, 
but that it predicts  some behavior that other respectable theories cannot ex- 
plain. 
Applications to Voting Behavior 
Romer’s immediate application of his theory is to voting behavior. Not sur- 
prisingly, a preoccupation of political scientists for an entire century has been 
to explain why and how citizens vote (given that voting is costly but is unlikely 
to affect outcomes and so to generate instrumental benefits). In the mountain 
of explanations for this seemingly irrational behavior, decision-theoretic mod- 
els are a fairly late entrant. Initially, practitioners of rational-choice  models in 
political science simply assumed that the act of voting was consumption, with 
citizens simply “feeling good” about engaging in participation. The tautologi- 
cal assumption that each citizen can capture R utils from voting even offered 
to escape tautology by actually explaining something: differentials in turnout 
rates by income groups and age groups. 
Romer’s work can be interpreted in the context of  this literature as providing 
an explanation for R, but one that is conditional on circumstances. In particular, 
R is larger if voting enables the citizen to cast a vengeful vote against a candi- 
date who  has broken  an  intertemporal  agreement of  the  form modeled by 
Romer. 
Of course, hypotheses like Romer’s are hardly new. Political scientists even 
have a term for it: negative voting. Indeed, for two decades a quite interesting 
debate has taken place concerning whether negative voting actually exists, and 
if so, whether psychological or rational-actor accounts provide a better expla- 
nation. A leading exponent  of psychological  theories  is Richard  Lau (1982, 
1985), who provides two reasons for expecting that citizens are more likely 
I. These and other extensions of the rational self-interest model of political behavior are dis- 
cussed in various essays in  Monroe (1991), many of  which are written by  proponents as well as 
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to respond negatively to political disappointments than positively to desirable 
political events.2 
Lau’s first explanation is tied to the idea of an altruistic superego governor 
of behavior: humans generally are thoughtful of each other, and derive pleasur- 
able and rewarding experiences from their interactions; as a result, a failure to 
behave  in  a pleasant,  cooperative,  reliable  way  draws  special attention  and 
causes others to have serious doubts about the integrity of the person  whose 
behavior is nonstandard. (This assumption certainly makes me wish I were a 
member of Lau’s department!) Hence, a citizen who observes noncomplying 
behavior by  an elected official  will be prone to conclude that the official is 
untrustworthy, engaging in noncompliance when behavior is unobserved, and 
to vote accordingly. This form of  response can be interpreted as reflecting the 
“availability  heuristic”-a  cognitive  pathology  whereby  an individual  over- 
reacts to unusual events. 
Lau’s second explanation is, like Romer’s, sociobiological. Lau argues that 
the “survival of the species”  is promoted  if people behave according to the 
precepts of Amos Tversky’s prospect theory-that  is, if humans go to greater 
lengths  avoiding  significant  costs at the sacrifice of  pleasurable  gains than 
would  be predicted  from an  expected utility  calculation.  Survival requires 
avoiding catastrophes, not having a good time. Hence, Darwinian natural selec- 
tion causes us, when scoring our political leaders, to give them unusually large 
negative scores for their mistakes in comparison to the positive scores we as- 
sign to their successes. 
On the rational-actor  front, among the leaders of the analysis of negative 
voting are Morris Fiorina and Kenneth Shepsle (1989, 1990). Their approach 
is to use decision theory under conditions of incomplete information to analyze 
whether negative voting is plausible. They offer two different arguments. 
First, Fiorina and Shepsle argue that one must be careful in asserting that 
negative voting has been detected because of a form of selection bias in elec- 
tions. If voters underestimate the worth of a candidate, the candidate is likely 
to lose and, therefore, not to have the opportunity to generate more information 
that  would  change voters’  minds.  But,  if  voters  overestimate  a candidate’s 
worth, the candidate is more likely to be elected, voters will then update their 
beliefs after observing poor performance in office, and the candidate will do 
less well in the next election. Indeed, if voters are Bayesian, the candidate will 
tend to do worse in every subsequent election until defeated. 
Second, Fiorina and Shepsle develop a game-theoretic model of voter be- 
havior in which a voter can decide how to weigh good news against bad news 
about performance in office. They demonstrate that a rational voter, facing im- 
perfect observability of an office holder, will overweight the bad news relative 
to the good news because to do so causes less shirking by the elected official. 
2. For a variety of other psychological theories of voting, see the symposium in the American 
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This model is very similar to both standard trigger strategies and to Romer’s, 
differing from the latter in that citizens elect to behave vengefully because they 
see its consequences down the decision tree, rather than because they derive 
pleasure from seeking revenge. 
Finally, as an empirical matter, no negative voting theory can explain most 
(let alone all) voting behavior. In all postwar elections, most voters have voted 
for incumbents, and most voters cast nearly all their votes for the same party. 
Votes against challengers who have yet to break their first promise, and for a 
party  regardless of changes in the policies of either party, can hardly be ex- 
plained as punishment. The most one can expect from negative voting theories 
is a more powerful explanation for shifts in behavior by marginal voters. 
The preceding brief, highly selective literature review is intended to demon- 
strate a single point:  neither psychology,  sociobiology, game theory, nor the 
idea that some voters are prone to vote against one candidate rather than for 
another are new to the study of voting  behavior.  Romer’s particular  model, 
however, is different than the rest, but to demonstrate its usefulness requires 
that it be run against other attractive horses. 
Application to Entitlements 
The final step in Romer’s logical chain is to argue that his version of negative 
voting sheds light on  the politics of entitlement programs. In essence, Romer 
argues  that  the  1950s  dance  between  Democrats  and  Republicans  about 
changes in eligibility  and financing of Social Security reflected  rational  re- 
sponse by  each side to their partisan differences about the program  and the 
reactions of voters to attempts to cut it. Vengeful voters, argues Romer, see the 
entitlement form of Social Security as a long-term agreement on which they 
have relied in making other long-term decisions (notably, about plans for retire- 
ment), and so would be more prone to punish a political official who reneged 
on this arrangement than another political  official who simply cut a transfer 
program to all old people. 
This account raises several important issues. The first is about the identity 
of the support constituency, based  upon the simple calculation  of costs and 
benefits, of  the  Social Security system as initially  designed  compared to a 
straightforward  old-age  assistance  program. The pseudoinsurance feature of 
Social Security makes the program  less redistributive  by  income categories 
than a standard transfer payment because it ties benefits to tax payments. And, 
because total benefits are tied more closely to current receipts than past payroll 
tax collections, a salient feature of the program is its intergenerational redistri- 
bution. A reasonable  interpretation  of the effect of Social Security  on most 
working-age  adults in the  1950s is that they picked  a system in which their 
children  would support them in retirement,  but preferred  one in which they 
would be more likely to live independently rather than on direct payments from 
children, perhaps within the same household. As a result, most working-age 
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(and this expectation has been fulfilled), whereas a similarly designed straight 
pension  would cause the net benefits of  some higher-income  individuals  to 
turn negative. The Democrats certainly favored greater coverage, and did, in 
fact, pass  a  sequence of bills  that gradually  made Social  Security (or state 
counterparts) virtually universal, but by  preserving  the pseudoinsurance fea- 
ture  they  retained  the  support of  some voters  with  above-average  incomes. 
Thus, to argue that “vengeful voters” provide an additional explanation for the 
episode reported by Romer, one has to find elements of attitudes about Social 
Security that are not explained by this simple model of self-interested behavior. 
I personally do not find anything surprising in the Democrats’ behavior to sac- 
rifice some progressive redistribution in order to secure broader political sup- 
port for the program, particularly a few years after the rise of the Conservative 
Coalition stopped further extensions of the New Deal. 
Another challenge to the vengeful voter theory is to make convincing dis- 
tinctions between this particular entitlement program and other governmental 
activities that reflect intertemporal commitments. In a sense, the nature of po- 
litical competition is for candidates for office to make promises about future 
performance. Each candidate offers a vector of positions on issues. For incum- 
bents,  performance in office provides voters with estimates of  likely  future 
performance, to be weighed against more uncertain promises of a challenger. 
Most likely, because of the centralizing tendency of electoral competition, vot- 
ers-at  least, the decisive ones-are  not likely to see one candidate as strictly 
dominating another on all elements of the position vector. Hence, electing one 
over another has an opportunity  cost-sacrificing  the advantages offered by 
other candidates on some issues. If a challenger runs for office on the basis of 
asking voters to sacrifice welfare on some dimensions in order to obtain more 
welfare on another, and then fails to deliver on the latter, should not Romer 
predict vengeful voting-even  when the net benefits delivered by  the winner 
are slightly higher than the benefits promised by the loser? What, then, differ- 
entiates entitlements as  sources of  vengeful  reaction  from other campaign 
promises that go unfulfilled? 
Perhaps the closest parallel to entitlements is a long-term public investment 
program.  Suppose the government embarks on a project  that is expected to 
take ten  years  to complete,  and  then  cancels the  project  halfway  through. 
Rational-choice  political theory predicts more resistance to cancellation than 
support for initiation, ceteris paribus, because once the project is begun, some 
citizens will have occurred sunk costs in reliance upon completion of the proj- 
ect. Hence, the expected net benefits that are required to initiate a program 
exceed the amount that, in midstream, are necessary to continue it. Vengeful 
voter  theory  should apply here as well, so that  some voters who derive net 
positive benefits from an incumbent’s whole platform will nonetheless vote for 
the challenger because the project  was  cancelled. Specifically,  a voter who 
would derive private benefits from the project  would have made parallel tax 227  The Politics of Entitlement 
payments to support it during initial construction, but would then not be re- 
warded in the end by the stream of benefits. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the theory is to explain all Social Security 
programs  (including disability insurance, survivors’ benefits, and Medicare). 
These elements vary  considerably  in the degree  to which  benefits are even 
symbolically  tied to contributions and in their generosity, Medicare,  for ex- 
ample, is certainly the most generous, bears the least connection between con- 
tributions and benefit entitlements, and so corresponds most closely to a stan- 
dard transfer program that would generate the least revenge from cancellation 
or cutback. It is also the element of Social Security that is growing most rapidly 
and the principal threat to bankrupt the system, yet it has been impervious to 
significant containment.  How  does vengeful  voter theory  explain this  phe- 
nomenon? 
These questions are important to testing vengeful voter theory because the 
latter predicts that, holding constant the magnitude and distribution of benefits 
from a program, negative voting is more likely for cuts in entitlements than for 
other programs.  If  this is not true, the theory cannot be distinguished from 
other negative voting theories. In reality, the degree to which a program can be 
regarded  as an intertemporal  commitment, requiring  some sacrifice now for 
benefits in the future that could engender a sense that the later rewards had 
somehow been earned, varies among programs. My sense is that this variation 
is more continuous than dichotomous, but in any case, the argument that en- 
titlements are somehow separate from all other programs seems to me to be 
insufficiently explained. 
Conclusions 
The thrust of these comments is that my comfort with Romer’s argument is 
far greater at the more abstract, general level of argument, and least at the level 
of  an application  to understanding  the politics  of  a particular  program  like 
Social Security. Economic modeling is obviously highly useful in a number of 
contexts other than analyzing private economic decisions,  and equally obvi- 
ously can add to our understanding of how people solve collective action and 
coordination  problems.  Romer’s focus on emotionally  motivated behavior as 
plausibly having value to humans in these types of circumstances is interesting 
and promising as part of the agenda for economic theorizing. For the specific 
case at hand, Romer’s argument makes a good case for explaining the existence 
of revenge and its likely partial-equilibrium  effects. 
My skepticism deepens as the model is extended to the specific applications 
of  voting  behavior  and the design of  a program.  Both  voting  behavior  and 
designing  programs  plausibly  involve  numerous  human  emotions  and 
values. They are also consequential decisions that are made after a protracted 
period of information  dissemination  and consideration.  Here much work re- 
mains to demonstrate that the motive of revenge is a dominant force, compared 228  Paul M. Romer 
to rational  pursuit  of  some combination  of  self-interest  and  interdependent 
utility. 
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